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Turkey’s Turbulent Journey with the EPAA and Quest for a National System 




This paper provides an overview of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense 
debate from a Turkish perspective. While Turkey participates in the EPAA by hosting a U.S. early-warning 
radar in Kurecik, Malatya, its political and military concerns with NATO guarantees have led to the AKP 
government's quest for a national long-range air and missile defense system. However, Turkish decision 
makers' insistence on technology transfer shows that the Turkish debate is not adequately informed by the 





With Turkey being the closest NATO nation to the Middle East and lacking a robust integrated 
air and missile defense architecture, Turkish policymakers face decisions on continuing to rely 
on NATO resources, investing in indigenous capabilities, or procuring foreign systems. While 
the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands have historically provided Patriot systems to 
southeast Turkey, Turkey has political and technical concerns about NATO guarantees under the 
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), leading to the proposition that Turkey needs to 
develop indigenous air and missile defense capabilities to reduce vulnerability. However, 
Turkey’s controversial tender for the foreign acquisition of a long-range air and missile defense 
system, dubbed the T-LORAMIDS process, has led to concerns within NATO about Turkey’s 
strategic orientation and intentions. 
 
This paper first identifies the missile threats to Turkey, mainly from Syria and Iran. It then 
defines Turkey’s role in the EPAA and the Turkish activities towards procurement of a national 
long-range air and missile defense system that would allow for technology transfer to eventually 
achieve indigenous design. The main roadblocks to Turkish missile defense are the EPAA’s 
technical limitations in providing continuous, comprehensive coverage to the entirety of Turkish 
territory, Turkey’s insistence on domestic production that has led to the consideration of non-
NATO systems, interoperability, and political issues. While Turkish authorities remain skeptical 
of the U.S./NATO security guarantees, this debate has proven that remaining interoperable under 
the NATO architecture and utilizing NATO resources as necessary is still Turkey’s most 
efficient policy option, considering the financial and technical challenges of missile defense even 
for the US. 
 
 
Missile Threats to Turkey 
 
Turkey’s calculus on missile threats is based on the wide range of capabilities state and non-state 
actors have in the Middle East, including ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced guided rockets, 
artillery and mortars, anti-ship missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.1  
 
Turkey’s definition of the T-LORAMIDS project as 70% air defense and 30% ballistic missile 
defense reflects Turkey’s perceptions in response to missile capabilities in its neighborhood: The 
system is only intended to address Turkey’s regional competitor’s systems, and not Israeli or 
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Russian missiles. 
 
Regarding Russia, Turkey would not try to or be able to counter its huge nuclear arsenal with a 
national missile defense system. However, it is worth mentioning that Russia deployed SS-26 
Iskander missiles in Gyumri, Armenia, in 2013, threatening eastern provinces of Turkey within 
its 400 km range.2 The Russian nuclear posture, military modernization, and the Ukrainian 
conflict all contribute to Turkey’s increased threat perception.3 Prior to the recent 
rapprochement, the situation was exacerbated by the November 2015 Turkish downing of a 
Russian Su-24 bomber along the Syrian-Turkish border due to airspace violation, and the major 
disagreements in the fight against ISIS and the future of Syria. 
 
While the threat evaluation requires the consideration of both capabilities and intentions, heavy 
involvement of external actors such as Russia and the complexity of regional political relations 
make these “intentions” less predictable. Hence, Turkish decision makers prioritize a capabilities 
approach in their threat calculus, particularly toward Syrian and Iranian missile capabilities. 
 
Syrian Missile Capabilities 
Today, Turkey’s most immediate concerns regarding missile threats originate from both state 
and non-state actors along its Syrian border. 
 
Prior to the civil war, the Syrian regime was capable of producing approximately 30 Scud-B/Cs 
per year but was dependent on foreign assistance, mainly Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, 
for the components and technology.4 The Assad regime has less than 100 road-mobile short-
range ballistic missile (SRBM) launchers and solid-fuel SS-21 SRBMs and M-600 Tishreen 
ballistic missiles, which is the domestic version of the Iranian Fateh-110.5 Syria also possesses 
Russian Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and cruise missiles designed for coastal 
defense.6  
 
The Assad regime has three surface-to-surface missile brigades, with a concentration of Scud 
variants at the 4th Armored Division for regime survival.7 The SS-21 (120 km range) and M-600 
(250 km range) can hit Turkish cities near the border.8 With the Scud-C (500-650 km range) and 
Scud-D (600-700 km range), Damascus could deliver both conventional and WMD warheads to 
Turkey’s southeastern cities and critical facilities, while it could reach Ankara from Aleppo.9 
The limited stockpile of the Scud-D variant that Damascus owns is particularly worrisome to 
Turkish decision makers, as the modifications for re-entry and improved range would lead to a 
decrease in payload and make use of WMD warheads more likely, demonstrated by the 2005 
Syria test-fire of 3 Scud-Bs and Scud-Ds at low-altitude airburst mode.10 However, the civil war 
has brought uncertainty to the location and status of the missile arsenal, e.g. 2014 media reports 
that Hezbollah moved long-range Scud-D missiles, Iranian Fateh-110 and Fajr-5 rockets, and the 
Russian ASCM into Lebanon.11 Since the conflict is prolonged, the Assad regime is likely to 
need to “replenish” its missile inventory by transfers from Iran, Russia, or China.12  
 
Throughout the conflict, Turkish cities have been hit by stray artillery shells coming from Syria. 
On March 24, 2015, a Scud variant Fateh-110 missile fired by the Syrian army from the Tartus 
Russian naval base against the rebels exploded in the Reyhanli district of Hatay in Turkey, 
leaving a 15-meter wide crater and injuring five Turkish civilians.13 The area was reported to be 
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outside the radar range of the Patriot batteries, leading to the critiques that the batteries should 
protect the riskiest area, such as Hatay, instead of the Kurecik radar or the U.S. airbase in 
Incirlik.14  
 
ISIS capabilities also threaten Turkey. ISIS fighters have been seen with Chinese-made FN-6 
man-portable air defense systems or shoulder-fired heat-seeking MANDPADS.15 According to 
U.S. intelligence estimates, it is also probable that ISIS fighters acquired the shoulder-fired 
Stinger missiles in Iraq.16 Throughout 2016, ISIS has been hitting Turkish cities, especially Kilis, 
with Katyusha rockets.17 
 
Turkey has also kept a close eye on Russian military buildup in Syria, despite the recent political 
rapprochement. Russia has deployed S-400 air defense systems in northern Syria with ranges 
extending into Turkish airspace. Russia has deployed at least one Iskander missile variant to its 
Humaymim Air Base according to satellite imagery.18 Turkey has also heavily criticized both the 
Assad regime’s and Russia’s continued missile and rocket attacks in rebel-held towns near 
Damascus and Aleppo, and hitting Turkmen villages near Latakia in November 2015 instead of 
ISIS targets.19 In November-December 2015, Russian warships and submarines in the Caspian 
Fleet and Mediterranean Sea launched sea-based Kalibr cruise missiles, the first use of the 3M-
14 submarine variant, at ISIS targets in Syria, despite the incidents of deviation in flight path that 
crashed the cruise missiles in Iran and the Arctic.20  
 
Iran’s Missile Capabilities 
While Iran’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) deal with P5+1 has alleviated the 
international community’s concerns with the Iranian nuclear program, Iran still has the largest 
and most diverse range of missile capabilities in the Middle East that can virtually target any 
critical asset in Turkey, including Istanbul, Ankara, U.S. and NATO bases. These capabilities 
include short-range artillery rockets, which can be used in irregular warfare, transferred to non-
state or proxy actors such as Hezbollah, and have strategic impact to support ground forces 
without close air support.21 
 
The main missile threats from Iran to Turkey are Iran’s SRBMSs and medium-range ballistic 
missiles (MRBMs). Iran has around 100 SRBM launchers that can be reloaded and fewer than 50 
silo and mobile MRBM launchers.22 The Iranian inventory of short-range missiles includes the 
Zelzal family (150-250 km), Fateh-110 (200-300 km), the Scud-B based Shahab-1 (350 km), 
Scud-C based Shahab-2 (750 km) and its upgrade Qiam-1 (700-800 km).23 Iran’s tactical ballistic 
missiles could be effective in an engagement with Turkish land forces close to the border, but the 
launches in salvos would be convenient targets for the Turkish Air Force.24  
 
In the medium to longer range, the Iranian inventory includes the modifications of the North 
Korean No Dong missiles, namely the silo-based and road-mobile Shahab-3 (around 1300 km), 
the flight tests of its modification, which is a longer range Ghadir-1 (around 1600 km, also 
referred to as Kavoshgar or Shahab-3M), and the solid-propellant two-stage Sajjill-2, or Ashura 
that may deliver a 750 kg warhead to a range of about 2000 km.25 Developmental systems 
include the Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 (3000-5000 km).26 By the 2020s, Tehran could have the 
capability to relocate the road-mobile Sajjill-2 for preventive targeting and its reduced launch-
cycle would undermine early-warning measures.27  
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Iran is estimated to have 50 operational Shahab-3 launchers.28 Iran also reverse engineered and 
manufactured copies of the Chinese C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles which has led to 
concerns that it could convert the HY-2 Silkworm ASCMs into longer-range land attack 
systems.29 As the threat of land-attack cruise missiles is on the rise, Turkey cannot defend 
against the Iranian cruise missiles without a more sophisticated system with airborne sensors. In 
March 2015, there were media reports that Iran domestically produced the long-range land-attack 
cruise missile dubbed Soumar, based on the Russian Kh-55 with a 2000 km range.30  
 
Iran conducts regular flight tests and exercises to demonstrate its missile capabilities. In July 
2011, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) conducted a ten-day live-fire missile exercise 
dubbed “Great Prophet 6,” showcasing the solid-fuel Fateh-110, the Tondar, and Khalije Fars 
anti-ship ballistic missile, as well as the liquid-fuel Shahab-3.31 Iran successfully launched a 
liquid-propellant, two-stage Safir space launch vehicle that can be used as an intermediate-range 
ballistic missile, in addition to plans for a larger vehicle called Simorgh.32 During the February 
2015 “Great Prophet 9” exercise, the naval wing of the IRGC implied that Iran had launched a 
missile from a submerged submarine.33 In August 2015, Iran unveiled Fateh-330, the upgraded, 
500 km version of the Fateh-110.34 Following the formal adoption of the nuclear deal with P5+1 
in October 2015, Iran test-fired a new, precision-guided ballistic missile dubbed Emad, leading 
to U.S. concern of violation of UNSCR 1929 and the nuclear deal.35 While the US was expecting 
that Iran would be launching a Simorgh space rocket into orbit, in March 2016, Iran test-fired 
two missiles that were thought to be the Qiam-1 and Shahab-1.36   
 
There are also technical limitations to Iran’s missile capabilities. Sankaran argues that Iranian 
missile capabilities are very speculative, as Iran has been alleged to “mislead and misinform” 
regarding their missile and space launch tests to “bluster.”37 The systems lack advanced precision 
guidance and accuracy in GPS.38 Elleman argues that the successful destruction of a fixed 
military target would require Iran to utilize a significant portion of its missile inventory.39 He 
interprets this problem as an indicator that Iran’s priority is enhancing accuracy and lethality 
over longer range.40 There is near consensus among missile experts that resolving these technical 
issues in the short-term requires direct foreign assistance and the sources are well-known.41 
 
While Turkey and Iran have historically had “neighborly” relations, prior to the JCPOA, Iran 
threatened to hit the Kurecik radar as a response to Turkish help to the “Zionist” regime.42 In 
Iranian Brigadier General Hacizade’s words: “If there is an attack on Iran, our first target will be 
the missile shield systems in Turkey, and then we’ll turn to other targets.”43 While Turkey 
welcomes the JCPOA, a major consideration is the exclusion of ballistic missiles from the 
nuclear deal. The sanctions on the Iranian ballistic missile program are expected to be lifted 
within the next 8 years. However, the latest Iranian fire tests have led to new U.S. sanctions on 
the country’s ballistic missile program.   
 
 
Turkey’s Role in the EPAA 
 
Turkey’s direct role in the EPAA began in the completed Phase I by hosting the X-band early-
warning radar in Kurecik, which is responsible for detecting the launch of a ballistic missile from 
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the Middle East and transferring the information to the U.S. SM-3 interceptors to hit the missile 
mid-flight. In addition, Turkey’s military electronics manufacturer ASELSAN provides system 
engineering to improve NATO ballistic missile defense and contributes to air defense projects in 
Poland and Romania.44 
 
The main concerns that Turkey initially had with hosting the radar were naming Iran as a threat, 
the U.S. command and control not allowing any Turkish influence, whether the missile shield 
would cover all of Turkey, and data sharing with non-NATO countries, Israel in particular.45 
However, Kibaroglu argues that the degree of divergence between Turkey and NATO was not as 
wide as it was reflected in the media coverage.46 Turkish authorities considered the radar as a 
sophisticated NATO defense capability that would be a strategic asset for Turkey’s protection 
against “actual and potential” threats from its neighborhood.47 They also perceive being one of 
the few host countries in EPAA as a privilege.48 However, the future role of Turkey within the 
missile defense system is uncertain.  
 
For robust defense, forward-based large radars in proximity to the origin of the missile are 
required, as the sea-based and land-based interceptors launch 100 seconds after the ballistic 
missile detection by the sensors.49 The X-radar is the first chain loop in the system to transfer 
information to the interceptors, and has to be located at an optimum distance from the target. 
Proximity of Kurecik to the Middle East provides an advantage to the NATO system in 
providing cuing information. Establishing each radar system costs approximately $200 million to 
the US.50 The radar is exclusively operated by U.S. personnel, and has a twin system at the 
Nevatim Air Force Base in the Negev desert in Israel.51 The U.S. Army allocates roughly $21 
million per year for the Kurecik radar.52  
 
While the US is likely to continue to host the radar due to its location, beyond the Turkish 
domestic concerns about sharing information with Israel, there are also critiques of the adequacy 
of the radar: According to the U.S. Defense Science Board, the TPY-2 land-based radar’s 
tracking range is not adequate for a robust defense of Alliance territory and increase in 
sensitivity is required, as well as extremely high speed data sharing among multiple sensors in 
effective discrimination.53 Authors argue that the AN/TPY-2 radar system was chosen in part 
because it has limited ability to see into the Russian airspace.54 
 
Following the airspace conflicts between Turkey and Russia in Northern Syria, in December 
2015, the NATO foreign ministers agreed on a Turkish air defense package to enhance air and 
naval presence, including maritime patrol aircraft, and an AWACS platform in the eastern 
Mediterranean provided by German and Danish ships.55 The new NATO missile defense 
architecture is expected to include an extra deployment of Italian SAMP/T in Turkey and an 
Arleigh Burke-class U.S. ship to be deployed in the Black Sea on a constant basis.56 While 
NATO underlines its commitment to Turkish security by readily-deployable forces, there is 
disagreement between Turkey and NATO on the types of threats and priorities, such as PKK 
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Currently, Aselsan, the Turkish military electronics producer, and the national missile 
manufacturer Roketsan have designed low- and mid-altitude air defense systems worth 
approximately 200 million Euros and 130 million Euros respectively.57 Hisar-A is designed to 
address short-range threats for the protection of land units, and Hisar-O is designed for the 
medium-range, for the protection of larger units such as air defense batteries.58 According to 
Roketsan officials, Hisar systems have a dual pulse (or stage), solid-propellant rocket engine (the 
timing for the firing of the second stroke is optimized into the guidance algorithm, creating a 
surprise element and uncertainty in maneuvers).59  
 
Meanwhile, Turkey plans to carry its offensive, defensive, reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
early-warning resources and capabilities into space within the next ten years.60 The Turkish Air 
Force is establishing a Space Group Command, an aerospace force unit that will specialize in 
satellite launches, reconnaissance space-based imagery, early warning, satellites, and satellite 
communications.61 The early concept design of a proposed space launch vehicle (SLV) has been 
commissioned to Roketsan. Turkey plans to invest $100 million to develop the SLV, dubbed the 
Turkish Satellite Launching System (UFS). SSM also has a vision to complete the radar 
requirements of the long-range, high-altitude air and missile defense systems, including an early 
warning radar and the “CAFRAD” Multifunction Phased Array Radar System, within the next 
four years.62 
 
On long range BMD, after years of contention, in November 2015, Turkey entirely dropped the 
tentative agreement with China’s CPMIEC for T-LORAMIDS based on technology transfer 
concerns.63 Since then, Turkish officials began to argue for an off-the-shelf “stopgap” acquisition 
until Turkey develops an indigenous system.64  
 
As the lead U.S. negotiator for missile defense basing agreements in Turkey, Romania, and 
Poland, Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose, states, NATO encourages the allies to develop 
and contribute their own national capabilities, including early-warning missile defense capable 
radars, in addition to basing support.65 However, the key to missile defense cooperation is 
interoperability to complement and supplement layered systems, as seen in Israel’s David’s 
Sling, Iron Dome, and Arrow systems. At this point, Turkey faces some strategic choices.  
NATO’s electronic warfare security codes require interoperability of the systems that will be 
plugged onto NATO systems, unless it is a “stand-alone” system. By purchasing U.S. or 
European systems, Turkey would benefit from an expanded NATO capability in the Eastern 
Mediterranean through the integration of a national Turkish system with the EPAA 
architecture.66  
 
Proponents of a stand-alone system or a possible non-NATO system argue that Turkey’s pursuit 
of air and missile defense technology is not a challenge against NATO. Regarding the China 
deal, Defense Minister Yilmaz had initially argued that the missile defense system would be only 
integrated to the national systems for Turkey’s defense without being integrated to NATO.67 
However, not integrating the national missile defense system to the NATO grid would only 
reduce efficiency and prevent the full coverage of threats to intercept ballistic missiles.68 
Meanwhile, high ranking defense procurement officials insisted that Turkey could address the 
concerns regarding information sharing between non-NATO and NATO systems by an 
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interphase filter produced by the Turkish AYESAS that provides one-sided information.69 A 
view widely unpopular among NATO officials, Turkey seems to have cancelled the initial plans 
but has not entirely ruled out the possibility.  
 
One of the off-the-shelf systems that is currently being considered is the “Medium Extended Air 
Defense System”- MEADS, jointly developed by the US, Germany, and Italy.70 The system uses 
a phase-array radar that provides 360-degree coverage that appeals to the Turkish decision 
makers.71 While this system was initially intended to replace the Patriot systems, the US decided 
to discontinue funding the program, and Germany has not finalized the agreement with Europe’s 
MBDA and Lockheed Martin Corp that they will fund the procurement of the system.72 The 




Turkey’s Roadblocks to an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Architecture 
 
Turkish decision makers face technical challenges that lead to gaps in coverage in the EPAA 
architecture, procurement challenges originating from the AKP government’s insistence on not 
purchasing an off-the-shelf system, and political implications on Turkey’s commitment to NATO 
in the midst of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, as well as Turkey’s military restructuring after the 
July 15th failed coup attempt.  
 
Technical challenges with EPAA 
There has been little debate in Turkey on the technical limitations and vulnerabilities of EPAA 
systems, such as intercepting countermeasures and decoys, lack of realistic battlefield tests, and 
inability to intercept low-flying cruise missiles. Instead, the discussion has focused on whether 
the EPAA can address Turkey’s security needs from purely a geographical coverage perspective. 
Ankara has been negotiating concrete security guarantees that all of Turkish territory will be 
protected by the EPAA plan. This idea was explored as an option to have 10 SM-3 Block IIA 
land-based interceptors at the Incirlik Air Base and Ramstein Air Base in Germany each.73 
However, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) plan to choose Romania and Poland 
instead left parts of Turkey uncovered, unless additional resources, such as the Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) system, were added to expand coverage and area 
defense.  
 
According to Phase II of EPAA, THAAD can be introduced as “potential surge” for enhanced 
medium-range missile defense for areas out of coverage.74 However, as the U.S. has more critical 
strategic assets such as military bases in the Arab Gulf countries, and can protect Incirlik Air 
Base from the sea, it is unlikely that a THAAD system would be permanently stationed in 
eastern Turkey.75  
 
Due to the trajectory of ballistic missiles and Turkey’s geographical proximity to the region, the 
existing architecture doesn’t provide defense over the entirety Turkish territory.76 The SM-3 
interceptor engages the target midcourse and therefore cannot engage the missile while it is in 
eastern Turkey during its ascent phase.77  
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To demonstrate this selective coverage issue, Sankaran simulates an Iranian missile attack with 
current capabilities on two U.S. bases in Turkey. First is the Incirlik Air Base at a 964-km 
distance to the launch site of a Shahab-3 in Tabriz, reached by the EPAA SM-3 IB interceptors 
(3.5 km/s burnout velocity) launched from the Eastern Mediterranean Sea with a time delay of 
100 seconds needed for tracking the target missile and pinpointing the location for intercept.78 
Second is NATO’s Izmir Air Base at a 16700-km distance from Tabriz, reached by the EPAA 
SM-3 IB interceptors launched from Deveselu, Romania with 100 seconds delay.79 Sankaran 
concludes that, in both cases, assuming perfect information, minimum energy trajectory, and no 
countermeasures, intercept is kinematically possible.80 Meanwhile, an EPAA SM-3 IB 
interceptor launched from Deveselu would not be able to defend against the missile attack on 
Incirlik Air Base, even with no time delay, whereas an Aegis ship in the Eastern Mediterranean 
would reach the Shahab-3 targeting Izmir Air Base with 100 seconds delay.81  
 
Procurement Issues and Financing 
Turkey’s policy objectives in national air and missile defense acquisition are strengthening the 
domestic defense industry through international partnerships in technology transfer and military 
modernization. Hence, the Turkish government set the selection criteria as the possibility of 
coproduction, cost, and delivery date, instead of the technical specifications and track record of 
the systems in effectively addressing the range of air and missile threats, and the political 
implications of the decision. It is also crucial to note that the Turkish Defense Ministry 
prioritizes cost and technology transfer, while the Turkish Air Force demands to acquire the most 
advanced systems, heavily influenced by NATO. Meanwhile, the discrepancy between Turkey’s 
national defense objectives and the $15 billion annual defense spending motivates Turkish 
policymakers to prioritize costs in decision making. 
 
Turkish security policy makers argue that Turkey remains dependent on the system providers as 
long as it doesn’t co-develop the technology. “If Turkey opts for direct purchase of the system 
then it will be obliged to make new off-the-shelf purchases 15 or 20 years later. We will not 
settle for this. Our target is to gain national technological capability in the missile project,” stated 
Ismail Demir, the Undersecretary of Defense Industries (SSM).82 According to a Roketsan 
official, the measures that technology-providing countries impose to protect their competitive 
advantage requires Turkey to eventually develop the technology themselves beyond transfer 
agreements in the procurement plan.83 However, they realize that Turkey’s national solutions 
might bring lower performance, longer production times, and higher costs. 
 
Political Considerations and Lessons Learned from T-LORAMIDS 
Turkey considers lack of air and missile defense systems as a strategic weakness that left Turkish 
security policies dependent on the U.S. and allies’ guarantees in every crisis. Turkey faced 
political hesitation leading to delay in the decision to send NATO systems, leading to loss of 
trust.84 If NATO provides the systems to Turkey, there is concern in Ankara that there can be 
“strings attached,” leading to the independence argument.85  
 
According to Turkish decision makers, since Turkey cannot rely solely on the NATO alliance for 
its security needs, it is rational to develop indigenous capabilities.86 L. Gen. Salih Ulusoy, former 
president of Turkish General Staff planning and principles, states that off-the-shelf systems can 
no longer be the only option for Turkey, but this effort toward independence should not be 
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interpreted as a threat to the U.S. defense industry, but as Turkey becoming a stable partner in 
the Middle East to cooperate more with.87  
 
However, Turkey’s quest for independence has not necessarily been welcome by its NATO 
partners, interpreted as a shift in Turkey’s strategic orientation away from the Alliance. While 
aiming to bargain for strategic advantage, Turkey almost made a decision to choose a system that 
would not be interoperable with NATO assets. In addition, the US was particularly concerned 
with the choice of the Chinese company. CPMIEC has been listed under a number of 
nonproliferation sanctions by the United States. Had Turkey proceeded with the Chinese offer, 
missile defense would have had broader strategic consequences on U.S.-Turkish relations.  
 
Turkey’s domestic constraints 
Following the July 15th failed coup attempt, Turkey has internal security concerns that 
complicate the decisions regarding its defense spending and priorities. In addition to the massive 
restructuring in its state bureaucracy and the armed forces, Turkey has gone back to conducting 
military operations in its counterinsurgency efforts against PKK, despite the ineffectiveness of 
air strikes. and joined anti-ISIS coalition operations. Major Turkish cities have also been targeted 
by ISIS. In addition to the high costs of the war against terror, Turkish economy no longer enjoys 
the high growth rate it had during the 2000s and has reached a plateau. Moreover, Turkey has 
spent $10 million for approximately 3 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey. Despite the 
financial aid agreement with the Germany for 3 million Euros, the future costs of hosting these 
refugees remain to be seen.  
 
President Erdogan’s quest for consolidation of power under an executive presidency through 
constitutional reform and the great purge in state apparatus following the coup attempt lead to 
concerns of increased authoritarianism, contributing to Turkey’s never-ending democracy issues. 
This domestic struggle has dire implications on Turkey’s regional and transatlantic relations, 
generating concern about Turkey’s strategic orientation.  
 
 
Lessons from the EPAA 
 
The main lesson for Turkey from the EPAA experience is how establishing a missile shield is 
technically, financially, and politically very challenging, even for the US and NATO.  
Technical challenges include but are not limited to low bandwidth of early warning radars, 
leading to discrimination problems against countermeasures and decoys, limited time for 
interception, need for continuous coverage, costs and lack of realistic operational conditions for 
flight testing, and the offense-defense cost curve being in favor of offensive missiles.  
Financially, each test costs approximately $400 million and generates terabytes of data to be 
analyzed, leading to one test on average per year.88 In adjusted terms, the U.S. appropriations 
since 1996 on missile defense add up to $274 billion.89 Since 2006, 150 to 250 million Euros 
(approximately $321 million) have been spent on theater missile defense, and additional 850 
million euros will be needed to expand the system in the next decade.90 European allies plan to 
contribute more than $1 billion to develop the missile shield.91 
 
Finally, BMD has strategic implications on Turkey’s political relationships with its neighbors. 
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As seen in EPAA’s impact on Russian and Chinese threat perceptions, an increased BMD 
capability is likely to trigger political reaction from countries such as Russia and Iran. Turkish 
BMD capability could also lead to missile and countermeasures proliferation in the region in the 
shorter range.  
 
 
The U.S. Role in Turkey’s Air and Missile Defense 
 
While the United States is working toward a region-wide ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
capability extending from Europe to the Persian Gulf, one of its key allies, Turkey, is questioning 
its role in the EPAA architecture and pursuing national air and missile defense. At the heart of 
the disagreements between the United States and Turkey are Turkey’s historic concerns about 
the U.S. commitment to Turkish security, given political disagreements and divergences of 
security interests, as well as the “bureaucratic red tape” leading to significant delays in defense 
cooperation agreements.  
 
In August 2015, the German and U.S. governments announced that the Patriot batteries and 
soldiers deployed in Turkey would not be renewed by the end of their mandate in 2016.92 
Meanwhile Spain continues to provide a BMD capability with a PAC-2 unit consisting of six 
launchers of four missiles near the Adana airport. The joint Turkish-U.S. statement underlined 
the U.S. commitment to support Turkish air and missile defense, and the need for “critical 
modernization upgrades” to the Patriot assets, prepared to return “within one week if needed.”93 
 
The U.S. withdrawal of the Patriot batteries deployed at the Gaziantep 5th Armored Brigade 
Command began in early October 2015.94 In order to prove their commitment to military 
coordination against the instability in the Middle East and increased Russian military buildup in 
the region, the U.S. and Turkish Naval Forces held a joint training exercise called the “Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea Exercise” in November 2015, including the BMD-equipped USS Donald 
Cook, submarines, surface and air defense units.95 In addition, the U.S. Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) approved a $70 million sale of Joint Direct Attack Munitions 
(JDAM) to Turkey to be used on guidance kits and hard target penetrator warheads.96  
 
Aiming to strengthen the defense of Turkey’s airspace against non-NATO forces, in November 
2015, the US deployed six F-15C air-to-air combat aircraft to Incirlik Air Base to join other U.S. 
aerial assets, including A-10 attack aircraft deployed at the base to fight against ISIS.97 While 
these deployments were temporary and were withdrawn in December 2015, the U.S. intention is 
to demonstrate to Turkish officials that their requests for air-to-air support can be fulfilled on 
short notice. 
 
Given the evolution of the conflicts in Syria and unstable relations with Russia, Turkey’s 
demands for U.S. security guarantees have become broader than missile defense and the EPAA 
architecture. One of the main points of contention between Turkish and American officials is 
barriers to defense exports such as classification of sensitive materials and technology, delays in 
licensing, and controlling commercial components as military items. Turkish officials argue that 
these difficulties function as an “embargo,” and lead to expensive and low-performing 
products.98  
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U.S. defense officials argue that there is an interagency process to develop a more flexible 
licensing mechanism for strategic trade authorization of close allies.99 They add that it is the U.S. 
strategic interest to reduce the complexities and impediments to sharing technology with Turkey, 
as its defense sector is growing and becoming more sophisticated.100 However, the Turkish 
defense authorities find this approach unconvincing due to the administrative delays that have a 
detrimental impact on Turkish security.101 Hence, a major issue to be considered in future rounds 
of strategic dialogue is how U.S. allies such as Turkey perceive missile defense as an instrument 
in the larger strategic relationship and could be given security reassurances in alternative terms 
tailor-made to their security needs.  
 
 
Consequences of a Reduced U.S. Role on NATO Missile Defense 
 
A reduced U.S. role on NATO missile defense is likely to trigger Turkey’s historical concerns 
with respect to reliance on NATO guarantees, due to the technical and political implications of 
such a decision. Without U.S. platforms, early warning radars and Aegis ships in particular, 
neither Turkey nor its European allies are likely to succeed in the integration of layered BMD 
systems and proper testing. These countries would not be able to carry the technological and 
financial burden of EPAA without U.S. support.  
 
In terms of the political relationship, a U.S. reduction in support for European missile defense 
would deteriorate the already stressed Turkey-US relations as a signal of abandonment. In such a 
scenario, Turkish authorities might go back to exploring non-NATO options for stopgap and 
technology transfer, which would have a detrimental impact on the U.S.-Turkish strategic 





The national air and missile defense debate in Turkey reflects a larger independence and military 
modernization trend. The “equal partner” principle—that Turkey should utilize its national 
capacities and be a partner, not only a market for international defense projects—is 
unequivocally reflected in the guiding principles for national air and missile defense 
procurement. However, given the technical differences between low- and medium-altitude air 
defense systems and long-range ballistic missile defense systems, it is a technological leap for 
the Turkish defense industry. Since Turkey is years away from achieving indigenous capability, 
it should continue to rely on NATO force generation as needed and maintain a coherent NATO 
strategy that involves missile defense, instead of independence from the Alliance.     
 
As seen by the progression of the missile defense deal with China, sudden deterioration of 
relations with Russia, and continued lack of progress in Russia-NATO relations, it is clear that 
Turkey’s resources and current capabilities are inadequate to address its security concerns 
outside a NATO architecture. In making future procurement decisions, Turkish decision makers 
should carefully consider not only the financial and technical limitations of missile defense, but 
also the political implications, to maintain interoperability with NATO. By doing so, Turkey 
benefits from NATO information sharing, early warning and tracking data from radars, and 
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intelligence. NATO pays for the costs of installing, operating, and maintaining expensive 
systems. Turkey benefits from layered NATO platforms, i.e. Aegis ships in the Mediterranean 
and the Black Sea, Aegis Ashore, THAAD if needed, PAC-3, and interoperability with the U.S. 
C2BMC (command and control, battle management, and communications system) and 
Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP).   
 
While the future of the EPAA architecture remains to be seen under the new U.S. presidency, 
considering missile defense as a component of NATO deterrence under U.S. guarantees is a less 
risky decision for Turkish policymakers than investing in disconnected, ineffective platforms of 
their own.  
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Timeline 
1991: After NATO’s slow response to Ankara’s request for air defense reinforcements during the 
Gulf War, Turkish Armed Forces create the Air Defense Master Plan to prioritize the acquisition 
of low-altitude air defense systems. 
1997: Turkey begins negotiations with Israel for the co-production of the Arrow air and missile 
defense system. (The deal fails in 2001 due to the financial crisis in Turkey.)  
March 2002: The Turkish Air Force announces the “Aerospace and Missile Defense Concept,” 
assigning the missile defense command to the Turkish Air Force. 
February 2003: France, Germany, and Belgium block the deployment of NATO equipment to 
Turkey, including Patriot missile batteries and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
surveillance planes prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. U.S. and Dutch batteries are deployed 
instead.  
April 2009: The Turkish Undersecretariat for the Defense Industry (SSM) issues a proposal for 
the purchase of a long-range air and missile defense system (T-LORAMIDS), and the following 
companies file bids for the $4 billion tender: 
- U.S. Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, PAC-3s  
- Russian Rosoboronexport, S-300, 
- China Precision Machinery Export Import Corp (CPMIEC), FD-2000 (export version of 
HQ-9)  
- Italian-French joint venture Eurosam, the SAMP/T Aster 30. 	
September 2009: The Obama administration notifies Congress of a potential $7.8 billion sale to 
Turkey, including 13 Patriot fire units, 72 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missiles, 197 
MIM-104E Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T) and 4 validation missiles, and 
hardware for ground-based air defense. 
September 2011: Turkey agrees to host the U.S. Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance 
(AN/TPY-2) early-warning radar system in Kurecik, Malatya.  
September 2013: Turkey selects China’s CPMIEC for T-LORAMIDS.  
February 2013: Following the June 2012 shooting of a Turkish reconnaissance jet by Syrian 
forces and shells killing Turkish civilians in Akcakale, NATO’s “Active Fence” mission begins 
in southeast Turkey. The United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and later Spain provide 
Patriot missiles for protection of the Turkish-Syrian border.  
August 2014: Combat Air Force and Air-Missile Defense Command is established in Eskisehir, 
responsible for missile defense control, strategic air assets, intelligence, and space activities 
under one C2. 
January 2015: Turkey extends the deadline for T-LORAMIDS bids for the sixth time to open 
parallel talks with Eurosam and Raytheon/Lockheed Martin.  
March 2015: The Turkish military’s electronics manufacturer ASELSAN launches a Radar and 
Electronic Warfare Technology Center in Ankara.  
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May 2015: Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) establishes a Spacecraft Assembly, Integration, 
and Test Center in Ankara.  
November 2015: Turkey cancels the long-range air and missile defense system tender.  
December 2015: The United States and Germany withdraw their Patriot batteries and soldiers 
from Turkey, while Spain decides to extend its participation in the “Active Fence” mission until 
December 2016.  
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